Bloomberg Beta is an early-stage fund (funded entirely by Bloomberg L.P.) that invests in "companies that make business work better," with a focus on the future of work and machine intelligence in particular. They prefer to be the first money into a company, write $500k-$1M first checks, and run an "anyone can say yes" policy because "the best founders and companies are polarizing." Above all they look for "a reason to believe a founding team is extraordinary" -- not the perfect resume, but "the capacity for greatness" -- and they care far more about a working demo than a deck.
Evidence of deep, durable commitment to a real problem in how business and work get done. They want founders who would pursue this problem "for a decade" regardless of funding, and a product that "makes business work better" — not a black-box technology hunting for a use case.
“Depth of commitment to the problem ("would do this for a decade, and keep going even if funding never appeared"), especially in learning the domain” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“"Makes business work better," without being in financial services” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“These products often start with a specific application of a well-understood technology, not a multi-industry "black box" looking for a use case.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“The future of work is about how everyone in the economy can succeed, and how founders can reshape business to make it more productive, humane, fair, and inclusive.” — Roy Bahat
A working product, not a description of one. A demo beats slides by 50x; they look at it the way a new user would. The best early products are the single most important service to at least some of their users, and start narrow rather than as a multi-industry platform.
“A demo is 50 times more useful than slides. One is a description of a thing, the other is the thing itself.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“We prefer to see products that are intensely successful in some initial market, over products that grow to large numbers but don’t play an important role in the lives of their users.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“We like for a product to be the most important service to at least some of its users.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“A wow of a product experience and/or extreme early growth and engagement numbers (for products adopted by individuals)” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
They explicitly do NOT chase headline TAM. They prefer dominating a modest market over modest share of a giant one, because depth of customer understanding (the Bloomberg playbook) is a more reliable signal of greatness. The market test is whether they have the judgment to pick the winner.
“We prefer enormous growth in modest markets to modest growth in enormous markets.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“it is harder to serve 100 customers exceptionally than to serve 10,000 customers poorly” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Clear initial target market, surprisingly narrow, and high on the gradient of influence” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“We fully expect that, if we succeed, one investment will return our entire fund. So we need to believe that every company could be that investment.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
Not absolute numbers — they look at month-over-month (or week-over-week) growth, cohort behavior, and most of all 'customer love': retention, intensity, NPS, or even unsolicited praise. The strongest signal is a product users love so much they tell others about it. At day zero, they care about what metric you'll track, not your milestones.
“At the earliest stages, we are most interested in evidence of customer love -- retention or intensity metrics, Net Promoter Score, or even anecdotal praise by customers for the product.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Do any users love the product so much they spontaneously tell other people to use it?” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“We focus on month-over-month (or, in earlier-stage cases, week-over-week) growth, ask questions about how different cohorts of users behave, and try to understand the per-user behavior” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“We do care about what metrics you intend to track -- what experiments are you running, what hypotheses is your first product testing -- and if there is one metric you care about more than any other.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
The single most important thing: a reason to believe the founding team is extraordinary — not perfect skills, but the capacity for greatness. They look for unusual psychology, singular past achievement, and depth of commitment. Trustworthiness is a non-negotiable. They are wary of founders who seem 'too textbook.'
“We look for a reason to believe a founding team is extraordinary. Not that they have the perfect skills or experiences to match the business they want to build (which is where the “team” slide in the deck tends to focus), but that they have the capacity for greatness.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“they think they are exceptional, see grand patterns others don’t, are indifferent to norms, and may have an exceptionally high pain threshold” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“We have passed on companies because we didn’t think the founders were crazy enough -- they seemed too textbook.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Would you work for the team?” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Trustworthy (e.g., will tell us when things are even a little broken)” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
They want a clear sense of why you're raising capital (where it gets deployed) and why venture capital specifically — they often discourage founders from taking venture at all. Surprisingly profitable unit economics is a reason to believe; sustainable unit economics in the future is non-negotiable. They prefer one sales model (individual OR company), not both.
“Surprisingly profitable unit economics” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Plausible to have sustainable unit economics in the future” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Only one model for how to sell, generally either directly to an individual or directly to a company (whereas many believe they can do both at first)” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Clear sense of why to raise venture capital (we often discourage founders from taking venture at all)” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
They are not scared by crowded markets — some of the greatest companies came out of them. What they want is a credible plan to win when a dozen other teams pursue the same idea, plus a clear sense of direct competitors and why your offering is superior. Defensibility through distribution or a #1 service in its market is a strong positive.
“If a dozen other companies are creating a company right now with this exact idea, how could you still succeed? (Some of the greatest companies ever came out of crowded markets.)” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Great teams have a plan to win when -- surprise, surprise -- they learn that a dozen other teams are pursuing their previously-thought-to-be-unique idea.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Clear sense, if applicable, of any direct competitors and why the company has superior offering for its market” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Someone else already tried -- good sign!” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
Among the signals they search for is 'the right moment in a company’s life' — a sense that the One Moment for this idea is clearly now. They believe machine intelligence is a present, cross-cutting shift that will transform every industry and function, which is why they declared it a focus area first.
“Timing -- that One Moment is clearly now” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“There are a few areas where we search for signs: certain qualities of a founding team, an early product, areas where we think we can be helpful, and the right moment in a company’s life.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“Artificial intelligence...in particular, crosses all the areas we care about, and we were the first fund to declare it as a focus area.” — James Cham
They want a clear sense of why you're raising capital and where it will be deployed — specifically, that you can prove what you need to prove to raise the next round after spending roughly half the round. First checks are $500k-$1M; they're happy to lead or follow. A demo and a tight written plan matter far more than a polished 20-slide deck.
“Clear sense of why to raise capital (i.e., where to deploy)” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Can prove what they need to prove to raise more money after having spent ~half of the round (because that's when founders usually need to start fundraising), or grow rapidly from profits” — Bloomberg Beta criteria for investing
“Our standard first check is from $300k up to $1M, though we sometimes go up a little higher.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“There is no standard format we like, but we probably spend 2-5 minutes reading a deck when we are deciding whether to meet a company. How many slides? Depends, but if you need 20 detailed pages to tell your story, that's likely more than we can absorb.” — Bloomberg Beta Operating Manual
“kindness, understanding, and modesty in the face of the incalculable improbability of predicting startup success are all much more valuable than being helpful”
“Artificial intelligence...in particular, crosses all the areas we care about, and we were the first fund to declare it as a focus area.”
“We have an “anyone can say yes” policy for writing our first check into companies we back.”